



**Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent
Representative of Pakistan to the UN at the IGN meeting on
Clusters with a particular focus on the Working Methods of the
Security Council”**

19 March 2024

Co-Chairs,

Pakistan aligns itself with the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Group.

2. My delegation supports the decision to dedicate an additional session to discuss the five clusters. We hope that the Elements Paper, which is reflective of the Co-Chairs' "understanding of and views on" the current state of the IGN process, will accurately reflect the debate done and the views expressed on all the individual clusters separately.

Co-Chairs,

3. Responding decisively to the increasingly complex challenges to global peace and security, requires the Security Council to act in an effective, transparent, accountable and democratic manner.

4. Securing improvements in the Council's working methods is an integral part of the ongoing effort to comprehensively reform it through the IGN process. While we continue to strive for - and hope for - attaining consensus in that effort, it is imperative that the Council itself also addresses its working methods to improve its functioning, including through the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG).

Co-Chairs,

5. The following are some of the key improvements required in the working methods of the Council:

- **One**, the most significant improvement would be the Council's full adherence to openness and transparency. Rule 48 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure stipulates that "unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public". Closed consultations of the Council, therefore, were envisaged to be an exception, rather than a norm.
- **Second**, the absence of an interactive discussion in open meetings, beyond the reading out of statements articulating public postures, compromises the Council's mandated role, particularly its duty to act on behalf of all Member States. It renders its work opaque and robs the wider UN membership of the opportunity to appreciate and

scrutinize the positions taken by various Council members. It also opens the door to back-door deals and pressure tactics, while enhancing the undue influence of its permanent members.

- **Three**, full transparency, including by (a) enhancing the quality and frequency of reporting to the General Assembly pursuant to Articles 15 and 24 of the Charter; and (b) holding public meetings and debates.
- **Four**, inclusivity in the deliberations, allowing automatic participation of non-Council members upon their request;
- **Five**, elimination or reform of the “penholder” system;
- **Six**, democratic process for the appointment of Chairs of subsidiary bodies; and
- **Seven**, greater transparency and non-discrimination in the Council’s CT and sanctions regimes; reforming them to ensure due process and effective remedy in their implementation.

Co-Chairs,

6. The Charter assigns distinct but complementary roles to both the Security Council and the General Assembly. It is vital to uphold and respect the General Assembly’s role as the principal deliberative, policy making and norm setting organ of the UN. We should all be seriously concerned at the continuing encroachment by the Security Council on the functions and powers of the General Assembly, in particular, by attempting to set legal norms and establish definitions for various issues that are squarely within the purview of the General Assembly.

7. On the question of the majority required for decision-making in an enlarged and reformed Security Council, we believe that decisions should continue to be made according to the provisions of Art. 27 of the United Nations Charter. UfC believes that in the case of eventual reforms of the Council, the number of affirmative votes required for decision-making should be increased to remain consistent with the 3/5 ratio of affirmative votes required in the current Security Council. This will also increase the weight of elected members in the expanded Council vis-a-vis the 5 permanent members in any decision-making process.

8. Finally, nothing undermines the credibility of the Council more than the 'selective' implementation and non-implementation of its resolutions. The Council should seriously consider how it can ensure the implementation of its resolutions, especially on longstanding issues and disputes on the agenda. Failure to enforce its resolutions undermines the credibility of the Security Council and erodes confidence in its ability to fulfil the responsibilities assigned by the UN Charter.

I thank you!