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Distinguished Co-Chairs,
We thank you for convening this interactive session and for the comprehensive set of questions to guide our discussions, today.
A number of other points were raised, yesterday. I will also try to address some of them.
Co-Chairs,
We heard an oft-repeated assertionthat while a vast majority wants Council reform, this process is impeded by a small minority of states.
This is plain fallacy, and an attempt to gloss-over fundamental differences.
As I noted yesterday, the issue at hand is not JUST divergent positions on reform; it is in fact, divergent visions of reform.
On the one hand, the UfC espouses a Council that is imbued with the democratic spirit of our times and is representative of the aspirations of all member states; on the other, for some, the reform process has become an unending quest for privileged status and projection of power.
While the UfC seeks to achieve an organization that is ‘fit for purpose’ to reflect dynamic and ever shifting global landscape; some seek to apply permanent solutions to ‘transient’ contemporary realities.
They seek ‘quick fix’ approaches. Indeed this self-serving aspiration for permanent seats at the expense of a comprehensive reform is the single biggest contributing factor delayingany reform.
The majority-minority calculus is another ruse from their familiar playbook. They aim to create the illusion that they speak on behalf of the majority especially developing states, when in reality, they only speak for themselves. All they desire is to crown their own ambitions with permanent seats.
They are trying to achieve this by moving their minority interests to the center stage and to peddle them as majority positions.
Their latest attempt is to ‘resuscitate’ papers, considered differently by different member states.
We can only hope to build convergences if they are constructed on the basis of consensus. Any other approach will be self-defeating.
Co-Chairs,
We also witnessedthat in bemoaninglack ofa ‘text’, references were invoked of other intergovernmental processes.
A distinguished colleague mentioned a certain multilateral agreement. I would submit that that agreement did not occur in a vacuum. It was preceded by a commonunderstanding between the sides to reach a clearly defined objective. The text was invariably a vehicle to reach that end. And the cart was not put before the horse.
Unfortunately, despite concerted efforts by the UfC, we have not been able to reach a similar understanding on Council reform.
Unlike a view expressed yesterday, an agreement on the necessity for ‘action’ is not enough. What is needed is agreement on the ‘specific’ action itself –willingness by all sides to show flexibility and compromise to find common ground. There is no other way to bridge our differences.
Turning to your questions, Co-Chairs, relationship between the use of veto and the over-arching objectives of maintaining the Council’s effectiveness and decision-making, is apt.
It is also a clarification that we have consistently sought from those seeking permanent membership in pursuit of their national ambitions.
After all, if the Council cannot reconcile the interests of its five permanent members, how can it cope with the interest of a bigger membership and still be effective?
Further, as the issue of veto is inextricably linked to working methods of the Council, how can additional permanent members improve its transparency and inclusiveness?
Clearly, any genuine reform of the Council cannot sidestep thesefundamental issues. They are too important to be deferred to some review mechanism in the future. Yet, we have seen the tendency by some to try kicking this can down the road.
Beyond their altruistic assertions, all we hear is that the issue is ‘complex, complicated and contentious’, and that it should not be allowed to ‘veto’ the process of Council reform, itself.
We were treated to statistics about the use or rather abuse of the veto. This brought forth the arbitrary manner in which permanent members have made use of the veto, casting a deep shadow of controversy over it.
It was a compelling case against veto.Intriguingly, those making the argument are staking their own claim to the right of veto.
In so doing, theyaimto address inherent dysfunctionalities of the Council by embracing the very anachronism, inefficiency and potential paralysis that has so clearly clogged working of the Council.
This is regression, not reform. Surely we don’t want to sign-up for this.
As I suggested yesterday, new permanence is nothing but re-enactment of old permanence.
It is for this reason than Pakistan and the UfC favour expansion only in the non-permanent category of seats.
As for ‘voluntary’ restraint, the title itself is a giveaway to its limitations – one, any voluntary measure does not inhere binding legal obligations;and two, as some permanent members have firmly opposed any checks on veto, this measure would at best, be a noble aspiration, not a universal standard of conduct.
As the UfC does not support expansion in the permanent category, for us, the issue of veto or its voluntary restraint does not arise.
Even if we were to hypothetically considerpossible extension of veto to an expanded Council, what is a matter of certainty, notconjecture, is that any proliferation of the veto would only add to its misuse, not restrain its abuse.
Turning to the issue of an intermediate solution, it goes without saying that any compromise, by definition, is less than ideal. This is true of the UfC model as well.
But perfect should not be the enemy of the good, especially when ‘good’ is the only realistic outcome. We know that convergence exists only on expansion in the non-permanent category. It should serve as the point of departure for any reform of the Council.
While some of my colleagues have already elaborated on the merits of the UfC model, I only wish to address those who object to any intermediary ‘approach’ based on longer-term non-permanent seats, especially when they have already accepted an intermediary ‘solution’ - permanent seats without a veto, albeit, pending a future review.
If they had only shown the same degree of flexibility to the larger membership, we would undoubtedly, have been underway towards a consensual and comprehensive reform of the Council.
Co-Chairs,
As for the imperative to enhance equitable geographical distribution, this is an outcome possible only in the non-permanent category of seats.
While we talk of two “categories” of membership, permanent members do not constitute a category per se. In the Charter, the permanent members are mentioned by name, without creating any pretense of regional or equitable distribution. They have special privileges and powers, including in decision-making, namely, veto. There are no listed criteria for their membership.
It is only in the non-permanent category that both the requirements of equity and representation are met. This category provides us with the space to work with different models, while ensuring equitable representation for the wider membership, including regional and other groups.
Such a composition allows usto maximize fair and equitable representation for all UN member states, through periodic elections and rotation, without discrimination and in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality.
Co-Chairs,
In conclusion, let me reiterate our hope that member states will continue to meaningfully engage with a view to reach agreement on the next steps in the reform process.
The key underpinnings for success are: a comprehensive reform and a negotiated outcome adopted by consensus. We are not looking for a utopian Council but one that reflects contemporary realties.
I thank you.