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Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for convening the second round of inter-governmental negotiations in the informal plenary of the 64th General Assembly.
We are now entering into a critical phase of the reform process of the Security Council. It is, therefore, important that we should proceed with prudence. We are confident that the President of the General Assembly with his important leadership role will make this objective a certainty.
This process of the Security Council reform should have full ownership by the Member States. Besides, it has to be based on the positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other groupings of Member States, as agreed in the General Assembly decision 62/557 which is the only basis for negotiations. A/63/960 is not a basis for negotiations.
In the first exchange of inter-governmental negotiations last month, Colombia and Italy formally requested that their comprehensive proposal on the Security Council reform may be circulated as a Conference Room Paper (CRP) for taking the process forward in a focused manner. This paper enunciates proposals on all key areas of reform, in consonance with decision 62/557. Our decision to do so reflects our flexibility and compromise from our earlier stated position presented to the General Assembly in 2005 as document A/59/L.68. Circulation of this document did not happen.
We regret to note that despite our full compliance with the format of the negotiations as well, as commitment to progress through flexibility and compromise has not been reciprocated. The G-4 does not even own or disown their position of the past, or shifts thereof, and seemingly want the Chair to distil it from their general and nebulous statements. In our opinion this is clearly an attempt to fire the gun, as we said earlier, from the Chair’s shoulders.
A desperation has been conceived and spread in the ranks of the plenary, decrying a logjam in the inter-governmental negotiations for Security Council reform and an unfair accusation, that some forces are trying to block the Security Council reform. Both assumptions untrue.
Thus an innocuous letter has been drafted to obtain maximum signatures by some members of the G-4 claiming that the only recourse now available for furthering the process was to ask the Chair to draft a text for convergence of views.
Some members debating the issue at luncheons, suggested to the Chair that if such a need arose, he would be better advised to form a partisan committee to integrate all points of view. This is still a relevant advice.
Many signed this G-4 letter under innocent belief without questioning the organizers’ logic, then all of a sudden a major victory was being portrayed as a decisive outcome for the G-4 for having secured a majority of 138 signatures and the celebrations ensued.
My first thought for this interpretation with disregard of consensual build up, is not regarding those who signed, as theirs was a goodhearted movement towards the message they received and believed which was, a move towards convergence and consensus. But my question is for those spreading the message, who deliberately and perhaps discriminately left out nearly 50 members of the UN by practicing selective exclusion.
I pause here to thank the Indian Ambassador, for at the briefing of the Secretary General on Copenhagen while waiting for the meeting to convene. Accompanied by the Brazilians and Germans, I queried him about the then new G-4 letter being circulated as we had not received it. He very warmly and good naturedly asked his companions as to why not circulate this letter to the UfC and all other members to garner more understanding and support and why not ask the Chair to circulate all received texts as well, so that all members may jointly move towards progress on this issue. I welcomed this suggestion and would wish to congratulate his fairness and vast vision. He also faxed me informally a copy of the letter but those collecting the signatures did not follow his good advice and may have had their latent reasons.
The question I now ask the members, does this augur well for consensual UN practice and tradition. With a southern African member state accompanying the G-4 for delivery of the letter and with floating remarks of the smashing of the Ezulwini Consensus by Member States of the African Union, it would seem that consensus has fallen prey to poaching. The steel fist has emerged from the velvet glove. Was this an innocent plea for taking reform forward or is this a covert numbers game coupled and complicated by charges of sabotage of the Ezulwini Consensus and disregard for African Unity?
This was more of a demolition derby than a building of consensus of the inter-governmental negotiation process. A veritable wolf in sheep’s clothing.
With complete respect for Member States and to ascertain realities, we immediately started to conduct consultations for as members heard from each other, questions needed to be answered. I would like to share some of these with you.
From the 138 signatories to the G-4 document in the short time available,
Level of response
Number of countries which were available to respond 89
Support of countries for G-4
Countries that signed the letter but do Not support G-4 52
Countries that signed the letter and Support G-4 12
Countries that did not sign the letter But included in the list 04
Countries that signed the letter but Did not have a firm position 21
Countries that want abolition of permanent category 14
The Oxford dictionary defines ‘negotiate’: to confer with others in order to reach a compromise as agreement; to arrange or bring about a result by negotiating.
How does the G-4 letter fall within this purview?
Mr. Chairman,
I have repeatedly asked in meetings for the formal proposal of the G-4 as stated positions of UfC, Arab League, OIC, the Philippines, S-5 and Ezulwini position of Africa have already been presented. Till today neither G-4 have formally stated their position nor have you elucidated. Furthermore, your circulation of this letter baffles us because you have not submitted the other letters also simultaneously submitted by OIC, African Union and the Arab League along with the G-4 letter. This attitude lends itself to prejudicial interpretation which will undermine the transparency of the process.
This personal selective approach does not bode well for equitable rights as manifested and protected by the United Nations process. We are instructed by the rules and consensus to negotiate – this letter arrogates the responsibility to you alone, minus negotiation, or are we to assume that you intend upon having receipt of the G-4 letter to negotiate on their behalf from your supposedly non partisan Chair?
Is the political commentary of the post Copenhagen press in undermining the UN system by denigrating it as the “multilateral mess,” being supported by the Chair through their suggested unilateral modus operandi? Is Copenhagen now to be the new regulation for UN decision making?
Why are we weakening the UN?
How do we move this process forward. It is our well considered view that all Member States and the groups of States should introduce their proposals so that the Chair may include them in a text for circulation and thorough discussion in this informal plenary. All the positions and proposals must be reflected in their entirety. Thereafter, the Member States may gather in a partisan Committee to decide on the options and proposals that may be included in the desired text for negotiations. The Chair must consult with all Member States for their elaboration. The nature and scope of document must be clarified. The text cannot be based on Chair’s summation, understanding, approximation or conclusions of Member States’ positions. This should be done as a matter of priority for achieving the objective of the long-awaited Security Council reform at an early date. In this context, the Chair has a cardinal role and we pray you play it.
Consultations should also identify the approach and structure of negotiations – the methodology to negotiate on the basis of the text. This cannot be a process of elimination. If certain positions were to be eliminated, there would be no reason or incentive for their proponents to participate in the negotiations. This should be a process of finding compromises among different positions, a process in which positions stay on the table while moving towards one another. In this regard, it may be useful to also identify in the document/text (to be elaborated), the compromise positions of various sides. (What is the original position and what is the compromise offer-this will show who has moved and who has not).
Mr. Chairman,
The reform of the Security Council is a significant joint endeavour. It cannot be artificially paced by simplistic generalizations or setting artificial timelines. I would like to caution that we should not look for shortcuts that may lead to a flawed Security Council with greater distortions in regional representation. The stakes are too high to err. We need to move swiftly but with caution and great care.
Thank you.