Remarks by Ambassador Farukh Amil, Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters 22 June 2009

Mr. Chairman,
  1. Thank you for convening this session and for your continuing guidance of our work.
  2. Our views on the three key issues under discussion have been expressed during the first round. These were not properly reflected in the overview. We also believe that putting these key questions under the rubric of Chapter V of the Charter severely limits the scope of the negotiations. It is neither consistent with the objective of comprehensive reform nor with decision 62/557.
  3. Relationship between the Council and the Assembly is built around “responsibility” and “accountability” which must be ensured in a reformed Council. This is directly related to the nature of reform. Democratic principle of periodic elections is the only mechanism that can increase accountability by strengthening the role and authority of the Assembly to determine the composition of the Council on a continuous basis. It is not enough to just refer to the need to adhere to the functions and powers set out in the Charter. In case of non-adherence, there has to be some recourse. The reform must ensure that the powers of the Council are regulated and limited to the maintenance of international peace and security. Similarly there should be mechanisms to review the decisions of the Council and their implementation.
  4. On working methods, there is a lot of common ground in the proposals that are on the table including those contained in the reports of the OEWG, the UfC, G-4, S-5, the Philippines and other proposals. We suggest that all of these should be put together and discussed in the next round, with a view to finalizing a part of what would be an eventual comprehensive package. Consideration of working methods in relation to the composition of the Council further strengthens our belief that addition of individual permanent members will aggravate the existing problems and will make the decision making more cumbersome and non-transparent.
  5. We hope that in the next round, veto will be part of the comprehensive discussion, and not isolated from the issue of categories. Reform options on veto include its immediate or gradual elimination, restrictions and limitations, as well as proposals for overriding the veto and of its review by the General Assembly. Enlargement of the Council with new elected members will itself be an effective way of balancing the power of veto. The number of affirmative votes required to adopt decisions in an expanded Council should be the subject of negotiations. We support the present ratio of 3 to 5 and are willing to consider a higher ratio. Increasing the number of affirmative votes will further democratize decision making and increase the burden of using the veto.
  6. In the discussion so far, we have seen the futility of claims on majority and minority positions. This kind of debate, we have had for years, without any result. We reject any suggestion to remove one or the other option. Removing options is no negotiations. It is like everyone going back to its original position. Therefore if the G-4 want to have only their option on the table, why are they engaging others in this farce of negotiations? Why don’t they simply put their resolution to a vote?
  7. Let me state that while we have shown flexibility to consider long-term seats only as a compromise, we continue to believe that regular non-permanent seats are in the best interest of the majority of the membership. Non-permanent is the only option on which expansion has taken place in the past. It is an option that can stand on its own, unlike the permanent membership option which needs the support of the jargon “two categories” and has no standing of its own. Even if one were to believe for a moment in the “two categories” option, one is nonplussed by the proposal that gives more permanent seats to individual countries and less non-permanent seats to the rest of the membership to which they promise and I quote “access”. Can we for example expect that if 4 countries want to have 4 seats for themselves, they would be willing to give at least 8 to the rest of the membership? No. For them, even one more non-permanent seat would make the Council unwieldy. So, if they will have to compromise, they will sacrifice the non-permanent seats from the “two categories”, not their own seats. No wonder, they are also suggesting that the small states may go and look for their seat among the few non-permanent seats. On the other hand, our proposal (Colombia-Italy paper) provides for a dedicated seat for small states. The OIC and Arab States representation can also be accommodated in our proposal through sharing/rotation arrangement between Asia and Africa. This is not possible in the G-4 model.
  8. Mr. Chairman, we need to adopt a different approach which is in tune with the spirit of the negotiations. It is not a question of producing new overviews or papers. The way to achieve progress towards widest possible political acceptance is to first identify the areas of convergence in all the key issues. On the other hand, the areas of divergence will require further negotiations in which the flexibility shown by member states and openings for compromise, including intermediate options, will need to be explored and clarified. This is where the dynamics of the negotiations lie and this is the direction in which we should be moving in the next rounds, to engage in “real” negotiations.

Thank you.