QUESTION OF THE VETO

Remarks by Ambassador Abdullah Hussain Haroon, Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters 16 March 2009

1. Veto is a core issue in the reform discussion. It is linked to the membership question, it being a primary characteristic of the 5 permanent members. Veto is also intrinsically linked to the Council’s working methods and the decision making process. Many of the problems of the Security Council that we intend to address through its reform are attributed directly or indirectly to the veto power. Reform of the veto should therefore be an integral part of a comprehensive package.
2. Regardless of any historic justification which may have existed in 1945 and which may no longer be relevant today, a large majority of membership is opposed to the concept and practice of veto. This is a principled position that cuts across the various geographical regions from Africa to Europe and also other groupings such as the NAM.
3. On most occasions, veto has been used or abused for national interests rather than to promote common interest and collective action for the maintenance of international peace and security. The frequent use of veto led to virtual paralysis of the Security Council during the Cold War. As we know, major issues remain unresolved on the agenda of the Security Council because the parties were assured by one or the other of the permanent members to use the veto. It is true that the exercise of veto has declined since the 1990s but its very existence and threat continue to affect the work of the Security Council.
4. In any case, Veto is in essence non-democratic. It is anachronistic. This special privilege is against the principle of sovereign equality of member states. Experience tells us that veto impacts negatively on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Council. Along with a vast majority of members, our preference is for the abolition of the veto right. However, the membership is faced with the unfortunate reality that any proposal to abolish or severely restrict the veto is itself likely to be vetoed.
5. This does not mean that nothing should be done with regard to veto. There are several proposals aired today to limit the use of veto and to exclude certain situations from the scope of application of the veto. All of these need to be considered on their merit and feasibility. Limiting the use of veto to Chapter VII looks appealing but it reinforces the wrong argument that non Chapter VII resolutions are in any way less important or not equally binding. Besides, the excessive and often unjustified use of Chapter VII in recent years has blurred the distinction and the original intent of the Charter for the use of Chapter VII.
6. There is growing sense today that veto should not be exercised in certain situations such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. There is a strong case to also bar the use of veto in situations involving external aggression, foreign occupation and self-determination. As part of negotiations, we are prepared to consider measures, involving voluntary restraints and possible Charter amendments to address these aspects.
7. There are suggestions to over-ride veto by a certain majority in the General Assembly or in the Security Council itself. In principle, we can support such measures though their ratification remains improbable.
8. Given these constraints, we need to consider what can be achieved in practical terms. For example, how can we have accountability in the use of veto? One way of doing that is to agree that when a veto is exercised, it will be explained to and reviewed by the General Assembly. If the General Assembly determines that veto has been exercised unjustly, it could decide to refer to the International Court of Justice to arbitrate its legality.
9. Veto is the power to block. Don’t think of it in any way otherwise. In our view, the most effective and feasible way of balancing the power of veto is to consider it in the context of the decision making mechanisms in the reformed Council. Firstly, a significant expansion of the elected non-permanent members will tilt the balance away from the permanent members. The burden of vetoing a resolution will increase tremendously for a permanent member. Secondly, in an enlarged Council, a higher number of affirmative votes would be required to pass a resolution. Keeping the current ratio (of 3 to 5), 16 affirmative votes would be required in a Council of 26. With a higher ratio, the affirmative votes required could be 17 or 18. This is where the blocking power of veto can be balanced, not by another undemocratic veto, but by the combined weight of 8 or 9 or more members of the Council who may decide to act together in collective interest. In terms of empowering the developing world, this will be a situation where for example Africa with its 6 or 7 seats, Asia with an equal number and GRULAC with its own can have a real say in decision making in the Council.
10. Going further, a concrete way of preserving collective interests is to reach an understanding, and preferably a Charter amendment, which would require concurrence of all members of a region for adoption of any resolution relating to that region. This may be of particular interest to Africa. We believe that such an arrangement will also be in step with the increasing emphasis being laid in recent years in the Council for adopting unified and consensus decisions for greater legitimacy and effectiveness.
11. In the democratic reform that we are pursuing, there is no place for individual privileges of any kind including permanence or veto on a national basis. We believe no individual country should claim or can be given such a privilege. However, as we have said before, we understand and respect the African position, which is a legitimate demand for redressing the historic injustice and for attaining equal rights for that region. We are willing to consider this continent specific and consensus position of Africa which is in the interest of an entire region, and which is fundamentally different from the divisive and country specific pursuit of special status by a minuscule minority.
12. The proposals that we have put forward on veto should be considered a minimum that we should try to agree during these negotiations. We are not in favour of pending the entire veto question to a future review.

Thank you.