Strengthening Collective Security and Armament Regulation

Statement by His Excellency Mr. Abdullah Hussain Haroon, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations at the Security Council Open Thematic Debate on Strengthening Collective Security and Armament Regulation, New York, 19 November 2008

Mr. President,

The Pakistan delegation appreciates the holding of this debate. We hope it will enhance understanding of various issues related to collective security and armament regulation.

It goes without saying that maintenance of international regional peace, collective security mechanisms and regulations on armaments are closely related. Effective disarmament and arms limitation measures which directly limit or reduce military potential are particularly useful in strengthening international peace and security.

While there is no denying the need for States to fully comply with the existing armament regulations and international arms control disarmament and non-proliferation agreements to which they are parties, let us not lose sight of the weakening of the consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation. Clearly, States differ widely in terms of perception, approach and modalities to promote peace and security – both regional and global – through disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Pakistan has, all along, stressed the imperativeness of evolving a new consensus on the whole range of disarmament and arms control and non-proliferation issues. This new consensus should be based on the principles of the UN Charter, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations, reflecting the security interests of all states, and guided by the principle of ‘equal security for all’.

Mr. President,

The architecture of a global consensus on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation should rest on a solid foundation comprising the following elements:-

• A renewed commitment by all states to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Transparency, verifiability and irreversibility should be the fundamental principles applied to all disarmament measures.
• Pending general and complete nuclear disarmament, there should be universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states.
• An international agreement on universal and non-discriminatory criteria for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear power generation. Policies of giving or denying access to civilian nuclear technology selectively in disregard of any generally applicable criteria detracts from the credibility and legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime.
• Commitment to evolving a universal and non-discriminatory agreement for addressing concerns arising from development, deployment and proliferation of missiles and Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) systems, which are inherently destabilizing.
• Recognition of the need for strengthening the international legal regime in order to prevent the militarization of outer space.
• In parallel with negotiations on nuclear disarmament, there is an urgent need for negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. As laid down in the Final Document of SSOD-I, these negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on militarily significant states. The disturbing trend of escalation in the number and sophistication of conventional weapons has to be arrested as it has a causal relationship with the continuing reliance on nuclear weapons.
• Cooperation in matters having strategic implications for a region should be pursued in such a manner as to ensure the right of each state to undiminished security, guaranteeing that no individual state or group of states obtains advantage over others.
• Armament regulations should not only be aimed at transfer controls but should also take into account existing asymmetries and military imbalances, stockpiles as well as production and manufacturing.

Nevertheless, armament regulations alone cannot facilitate the objective of international peace and security unless pursued in parallel with efforts for the peaceful settlement of disputes and removing underlying security concerns of states.

Regional tensions contribute to arms race, endangering not only international peace and security, but also undermining efforts aimed at arms control and disarmament.

Conflict resolution and maintenance of strategic and conventional stability at the regional and global level should, therefore, be at the core of efforts for strengthening international peace and security.

The principle of equal security for all necessitates open consultations and dialogue among states without pre-conditions. The best venue to pursue such consultations and negotiations is the United Nations General Assembly where all member States are represented.

Entrusting the responsibility for collective security to the Security Council and the tendency of the Security Council to legislate on behalf of the Member States on matters of armaments control is bound to raise security concerns of the overwhelming majority of the developing countries who are not represented in the Security Council.

The existing export control arrangements, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control

Regime (MTCR), are exclusive. The restricted nature of certain export control arrangements is an impediment to the global implementation of non-proliferation standards. If states are required to meet standards set by these arrangements, they should be given the opportunity to participate in these arrangements and benefit by sharing best practices and experiences of the founding members of these arrangements in the area of export controls. This, also, would enable States to keep abreast of technical advancements.

Moreover, members of these exclusive arrangements have been creating discriminatory exceptions to their own rules thus undermining the objective of international stability. Non criteria based civil nuclear cooperation based on commercial consideration does nothing to promote international non-proliferation objectives. Similarly MTCR is undermined by international cooperation in the development of ABMs which involves cooperation in dual use technologies such as solid fuel propulsion systems, missile targeting and guidance systems etc. which can be used for the development of offensive missiles.

Mr. President,

I would conclude by reiterating the need to evolve multilaterally negotiated, non-discriminatory and universal regulations on armaments.

Thank you Mr. President,