Security Council Resolution on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations (28th April, 2004)

Mr. President,

Pakistan shares the objective of promoting the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have expressed our support for the non-proliferation goals outlined in the statement of President Bush of United States on 11 February this year. We shall cooperate with all international endeavours that seek to promote fair and equitable solutions to non-proliferation challenges, including those arising from the risk of terrorists and other non-state actors acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction.

  1. We share the central objective of the draft resolution to prevent terrorists and non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. However, some of the provisions of the resolution on non-proliferation, which was circulated in the Council a few weeks ago, after a long process of restricted consultations among the 5 permanent members, raised concerns of a systemic nature and also specific to the situation and status of Pakistan which is a nuclear weapons state. We outlined these concerns in our statement in the Council’s open debate on 22 April.
  2. We appreciate the serious efforts made by the sponsors of the draft resolution to accommodate our major concerns and those of other states. The draft resolution has been revised three times. This has enabled Pakistan to support the resolution.
  3. First, Pakistan shares the general view, expressed in the Council’s open debate, that the Security Council cannot legislate for the world. The sponsors have assured that this resolution is designed to address a “gap” in international law to address the risk of terrorists and non-state actors acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction and that it does not seek to prescribe specific legislation which is left to national action by states. This has been made specific in operative para 2 of the resolution.

  4. Second, Pakistan also shares the general view of the UN membership that the Security Council cannot assume the stewardship of global non-proliferation and disarmament issues. The Security Council, composed of 15 states, is not a representative body. It cannot enforce the obligations assumed by five of its members which retain nuclear weapons since they also possess the right of veto in the Council. Global disarmament and non-proliferation can be achieved only in a more universal and non-discriminatory forums, especially the Conference on Disarmament – the sole multilateral negotiating forum on Disarmament. We thus welcome the affirmation in the draft resolution of the importance and role of various treaty bodies dealing with non-proliferation and disarmament.

  5. Third, the provisions of the revised text affirms that this resolution is designed specifically to address the threat of WMD acquisition or development by terrorists and other non-state actors. Preambular paragraph 8 of the draft resolution speaks of the risk that non-state actors, such as those identified in resolution 1267 and 1373, “may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery”; preambular paragraph 9 speaks about the threat of illicit trafficking “in the weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and related materials” and preambular paragraph 14 reaffirms the need to combat threats to international peace and security “caused by terrorist acts”. These preambular paragraphs define the purposes and scope of the resolution.

  6. Fourth, the central obligations created in the draft resolution are contained in operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the revised text. Pakistan has already fulfilled most of these requirements. Pakistan has put in place appropriate mechanisms and adequate physical security arrangements for the effective control of our strategic assets, materials and sites. We are further strengthening our export control laws. Pakistan's laws already require express procedures to control chemical weapons, biological weapons and nuclear materials and missile technology. Any individual or entity violating our laws is subject to legal action, including possible criminal prosecution under these laws.

  7. Fifth, under this resolution, legally binding obligations under Chapter-VII arise only in respect to operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 which start with the word “decides”, and which, at our request, have been grouped together for presentational purposes. This offers reassurance that the provisions of the draft resolution will not serve to impose non-proliferation obligations on states or to transfer the general responsibilities for global non-proliferation and disarmament to the Security Council.

  8. Sixth, we appreciate the changes introduced by the sponsors to clarify that there is no intention to oblige states to join treaties or arrangements to which they are not parties. Thus, preambular paragraph 5 now specifies that the reference to support for multilateral treaties is important “for all states parties”. Similarly, preambular paragraph 11 also recognizes that the binding legal obligations which are mentioned are only those arising from “treaties to which they are parties”. Similarly, operative paragraph 6(a) regarding “universal adoption” “full implementation” and possible “strengthening” of multilateral treaties is restricted to “states which are parties to these treaties”. As is well known, Pakistan is not a party to certain treaties and arrangements, such as the NPT, NSG and MTCR, which do not accommodate the reality that Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state.

  9. Seventh, we welcome the insertion of the word “henceforth” in preambular paragraph 15 of the draft resolution which makes it explicit that the provisions of this draft resolution are not retroactive but would apply only to events from the date of the adoption of this resolution.

  10. Eighth, the revised text of operative paragraph 4 has now clarified the limited and specific nature of the role of the Committee that is being created. The duration of the life of this Committee, as operative paragraph 4 now states, will be “no longer than two years”. Pakistan will be able to submit the report sought in this paragraph within the prescribed six months.

Mr. President,

  1. Pakistan continues to believe that the goal of preventing WMD proliferation by non-state actors, as also by states, can be best addressed in universal and non-discriminatory forums. We hope that negotiations to elaborate international treaties on the issues addressed in the present resolution will be initiated and concluded as soon as possible, thus relieving the Security Council of the exceptional responsibilities it has assumed under this draft resolution.

  2. Finally, Mr. President, let me clarify Pakistan’s policy on non-proliferation and disarmament, including in the context of this resolution.

  3. Pakistan strongly supports the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament. We shall scrupulously fulfill the obligations which we have freely accepted by sovereign decisions under international treaties and other arrangements. As a party to the CWC and the BWC, we believe that proliferation by state or non-state actors in these fields can be best achieved through full implementation of the provisions of these treaties. The outstanding issues relating to CWC implementation – including the destruction of chemical weapons stocks – should be resolved through the OPCW. Biological weapons are the most likely weapon of mass destruction that could be acquired by terrorists and non-state actors as well as by states. Biological weapons technology is evolving rapidly. A universal and equitable verification mechanism to prevent biological weapons proliferation is now more essential than ever.

  4. The situation in the area of nuclear non-proliferation as well as missile proliferation is considerably more complicated. Several states, including Pakistan, are not parties to the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or the MTCR. Pakistan was obliged to develop nuclear weapons and related delivery systems to maintain credible minimum deterrence against external aggression, especially once similar capabilities were developed and demonstrated by our eastern neighbour. The nuclear non-proliferation regime needs to accommodate the reality of the existence of nuclear weapons in South Asia. A recognition of this reality would enable Pakistan to cooperate more fully in promoting the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

  5. Given this reality, Pakistan will not accept any demand for access, much less inspections, of our nuclear and strategic assets, materials and facilities. We will not share any information – technical, military or political – that would negatively affect our national security programmes or our national interests.

  6. Pakistan will continue to develop its nuclear, missiles and related strategic capability to maintain the minimum credible deterrence viz-e-viz our eastern neighbour, which is embarked on major programmes for nuclear weapons, missiles, anti-missile and conventional arms acquisition and development. We have proposed the creation of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia encompassing nuclear-weapons and confidence building measures; a conventional balance of arms and the resolution of underlying disputes. We hope to promote such a regime under the composite dialogue recently agreed by the two states. An experts level meeting on “nuclear CBMs” will be held next month.

Mr. President

  1. The Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, remains paralyzed mainly because of the refusal by one or two major states to open multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer-space. This paralysis has also frozen the prospects of concluding a treaty to ban the future production of fissile materials. We trust that the sponsors of this draft resolution will contribute to unblocking these negotiations and refrain from taking any steps, which could destabilize strategic stability at the global or regional level and defeat the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation.