
Mr. Co-Chairman,

I thank the Co-Chairs for the preparation of the draft elements for a “UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy”.

2. We understand that it, in some ways, is compilation text which reflects the views and suggestions offered by delegations in the informal discussions held earlier on the Secretary-General's Report.

3. We respect and appreciate the effort made by the two Co-Chairs to find “common ground” in the document. In this context, I have two comments:

One, common ground can be found only once the legitimacy of the opposing viewpoints is acknowledged and reflected in the negotiating process. The draft elements, unfortunately, do not – at least explicitly – reflect the priorities and proposal of certain delegations, including my country and some other OIC countries, on important issues e.g. the definition of terrorism; the need to address underlying causes, such as foreign occupation and the suppression of self-determination; the issue of “state terrorism”; the problem of insults and defamation of religions and cultures; the need for vigorous international efforts to promote socio-economic development and employment-creation to end extremism and terrorism. If agreement is to be reached on the comprehensive strategy, these and other difficult issues will have to be addressed and agreed approaches evolved.

Two, common ground is likely to be evolved not through ambiguous phraseology or avoidance of “problem” issues through euphemisms. They can be resolved only in an open and honest negotiating process. This negotiating process cannot be short-circuited by the repeated and deliberate omission of the difficult issues in the documents prepared for the consideration of member States.

4. Second, even though the draft elements omit or avoid some difficult issues, the document produced is, obviously, too long and too detailed to serve as a “strategy”. Its focus is, like the Secretary-General's report, on operational details, rather than the normative and political issues on which agreement is required for a “strategy” to provide value-addition to the current efforts of the international community to combat terrorism.

5. Third, the structure of the document is somewhat confusing and perhaps inadequate. Sections on an “introduction” and “guiding principles” are obviously a good beginning. But, the division of the rest of the document into the 3 Sections on “Measures” to (i) address "conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; (ii) prevent and combat terrorism; and (iii) ensure respect for human rights, are too broad. Each of the three sections includes “operational” and “policy measures” which are, in part at least, overlapping and potentially contradictory.
6. **Fourth**, the provisions included under each part of the document are also arbitrarily placed. Some of the provisions in the introduction could well be included as “general principles”. Some of the “general principles” could be included in the introduction and/or in one of the other 3 sections of the document. Also, operational and policy measures are not always distinguishable from each other and often amount to “exhortation” only (e.g. to encourage; invite etc.)

7. **Fifth**, the draft elements – like the Secretary-General’s report – are nicely focused on action within the UN. In our view, the purpose and value of the exercise is to evolve a global strategy for agreed, coherent and effective action by Member States; not only to promote coherence among the proliferating activities of UN bureaucracies on terrorism.

8. **Sixth**, several of the words concepts, actions offered in the draft elements – as also in the Secretary-General’s Report – need clarification, legally and politically. For instance, there is no clarity on what constitutes “instigation” of terrorism; “sanctuaries” for terrorists; “victims of terrorism”. Some other words are loosely used e.g. “soft targets”; internationally shared values”.

9. **Seventh**, the draft elements in several paragraphs want to “take note” of the “intention” of the Secretary-General to take certain actions e.g. to institutionalize the Counter-Terrorism Task Force. While we do not necessarily disagree with the intended action, surely such actions need to be approved by Member States, especially where they require the expenditure of additional resources.

10. In my intervention in the earlier consultations, and in bilateral contexts with you, Co-Chairs, we had suggested that a possibly useful structure of the strategy document could be to group its provisions into 3 time-frames for realization: short, medium and long-term. We continue to believe that such a structure could better capture all the elements of a comprehensive strategy and also enable us to reach agreement on ways to address some of the difficult or problem issues I have mentioned earlier.

11. In order to further illustrate this approach, my delegation has prepared on outline of a possible strategy document, which I am circulating with this statement. Our outline includes **first**: an introduction, which records the background of our endeavour to evolve a strategy; **second**, sets out the objectives of a comprehensive strategy; **third**, lists the “general principles” for the strategy; **fourth**, sets out “Short-Term, Medium-Term and Long-Term Measures, which include both operational, normative and policy issues that could be achieved within the three time-frames. Finally, it includes a section on institutional measures, both at the Secretariat and inter-governmental levels.

12. I wish to emphasize that this is only a broad outline. But, we believe it offers an idea of how we could differentiate the different issues in a clear and coherent manner in a comprehensive strategy. The three timeframes will, we believe, also enable us to address all issues, including the difficult issues, by
reflecting the degree of agreement that exists on each and providing for processes designed to evolve full agreement on these issues. It is only thus that we can hope to evolve a strategy that is comprehensive and which can evoke the support of the widest possible majority of Member States.