Mr. Chairman,

The Pakistan delegation congratulates you on your election as the chairman of the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission this year. My delegation also extends felicitations to the members of the Commission’s Bureau on their election and to the chairs of the two Working Groups. We assure you of our support and cooperation.

2. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome the new Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, Ambassador Nobuaki Tanaka. We wish him success as he assumes new responsibilities.

Mr. Chairman,

3. The UNDC session has two items on its agenda – a) recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and b) practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons. In addition to these two agenda items, the Commission shall also discuss “measures for improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the Commission”. We hope the Commission would be able to overcome the differences surrounding the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda and agree on actions required at the international and regional levels with a view to reviving prospects for effective nuclear and conventional disarmament and its meaningful contribution to international and regional peace and security.

4. With regard to agenda item one, the Commission should be able to recommend ways and means of addressing the motives which drive States to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These motives include perceived threats from superior conventional or non-conventional forces; the existence of disputes and conflicts with more powerful States; and from discrimination in the application of international norms and laws.

5. The new threat of terrorists acquiring WMD must also be addressed. The threat of proliferation can be contained only if it is accompanied by a parallel effort to realize WMD disarmament. Discrimination and asymmetric possession of WMD is not a recipe for non-proliferation or regional or global stability. To deal with this threat effectively, collective and cooperative measures, not coercion and discrimination will yield success. At the same time, new threats should not obscure the dangers posed by the existence and continuous improvement i.e. vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin and must be promoted and pursued simultaneously.

Mr. Chairman,

6. Initiatives that bypass the existing multilateral framework offer only temporary solutions for counter-proliferation, non-proliferation and non-compliance. An unequal and restricted Security Council cannot supplant or circumvent multilateral negotiating processes. Unilateral restrictions and selective regimes will not promote security; they will exacerbate insecurity.

7. Elaboration of treaty regimes is no doubt an arduous exercise, but once treaties have been agreed freely, they have a better chance of commanding adherence and compliance. It is therefore important that the mandate of the Security Council 1540 Committee should now be transferred to a more representative and legitimate body within the UN General Assembly.
8. In the area of nuclear disarmament, credible steps by nuclear weapon states within a reasonable time frame are essential to revalidate the “bargain” on disarmament and non-proliferation and restore a genuine balance between them. Cooperation in the peaceful use of energy must also continue to enjoy international support under globally agreed conditions. There is need to reconcile nuclear reality within the global non-proliferation regime i.e. the existence of 8, not 5, nuclear weapons States. This needs to be achieved on a systemic and non-discriminatory basis that strengthens rather than weakens the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Discriminatory approaches and double standards will not serve these objectives.

9. Although Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state, it subscribes to the objectives of the NPT. We are fulfilling the NPT’s non-proliferation norms and objectives. Pakistan is prepared on a voluntary and non-discriminatory basis to continue to act in consonance with the obligations, undertaken by nuclear weapon states, under Article I, II and III of the NPT. Efforts to secure the universality of the NPT are commendable but they must take account of realities that are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Chairman,

10. Pakistan supports negotiations on a fissile material treaty (FMT) in accordance with the Shannon Mandate and the A-5 proposal for a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty. The report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) clearly identifies the key issues which include a) scope of the treaty, b) past and future production of fissile material and c) management of such material. The agreed basis for negotiating the Treaty cannot be described as "pre conditions".

11. Unless nuclear disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear weapon states will continue to be entitled to assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. The security assurances offered by most nuclear weapons states are restrictive, partial and qualified and do not enhance the security of the non-nuclear weapon state. Threats to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in certain circumstances must be disavowed.

12. We share the view that the existing international legal instruments are inadequate to prevent weaponization of outer space. There is a need to consolidate and reinforce the regime and enhance its effectiveness even as we comply strictly with existing agreements. China and Russia, in this regard, have done important work. We, therefore, support the A-5 proposal to commence work on PAROS in a CD Ad Hoc Committee.

13. We also share the global concern regarding unbridled ballistic missile proliferation. To avert it, we call for enhanced efforts to conclude a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and universally negotiated treaty within the United Nations system on missiles covering all aspects.

Mr. Chairman,

14. While international attention is focused on the need to control weapons of mass destruction, the trade and military expenditures in conventional weapons continue to rise. After an initial decline in the outlays on conventional weapons in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, in the recent years there is a surge in expenditures and a build up of conventional armaments and armed forces.

15. The Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD I) characterized the global military expenditure in 1978 as a "colossal waste of resources" and called for not only reduction in such spending, but for the reinvestment of such resources into efforts to fight poverty and improve human condition.
16. By that yardstick, cumulatively, global trends in military expenditures worldwide are both staggering and alarming. In 2004, the total military spending rose to $1.035 trillion, at 2005 prices. This is in sharp contrast to the total budget of the United Nations, mandated to maintain international peace and security, which is less than 1.5% of world’s military expenditure. The total value of arms transfer agreements in 2004 has been estimated at $37 billion, a significant increase over 2003. In 2004, the value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations was nearly $21.8 billion - an increase of $15.1 billion compared to 2003.

17. The total value of international arms transfer agreements, during the period 2001 to 2004, was $131.2 billion. During this period, developing countries accounted for 63.2% of all international arms deliveries. Globalized arms production and sales continue to ignore the grave humanitarian, political and strategic consequences of conventional weapons proliferation.

Mr. Chairman,

18. In view of these disturbing trends, it is imperative to pursue conventional arms control, at the lowest possible levels of armaments and military forces, in order to promote regional and international peace and security. We believe that the preservation of a balance in the defense capabilities of states at the lowest levels of armaments should be the prime objective of conventional arms control.

19. Conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and subregional contexts since most threats to peace and security arise mainly in states located in the same region or subregion. In this regard, we can adapt and follow good practices. The value of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, a cornerstone of European security, cannot be underestimated. States with larger military capabilities have a special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security.

20. The General Assembly has passed a resolution entitled “Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels” which requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider formulating the principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control. The General Assembly has also adopted a resolution titled “Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Regional and Sub-regional context”. This resolution emphasizes that the objective of CBMs should be to help strengthen international peace and security and be consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments. It also encourages the promotion of bilateral and regional CBMs to avoid conflict and prevent unintended and accidental outbreak of hostilities. We hope that the Commission could draw on these resolutions in preparing recommendations on CBMs in the field of conventional weapons.

21. In South Asia, we are pursuing a Strategic Restraint Regime, which has three constituents: nuclear and missile restraint; conventional balance; and conflict resolution. Even as we pursue the composite dialogue and confidence-building measures to resolve outstanding issues and promote strategic stability and nuclear risk reduction, we will continue to strive for a conventional balance at the lowest possible level of armaments since an imbalance could threaten stability, both conventional and non-conventional. In the interest of peace and security in South Asia, there must be restraint both in the demand and the supply of conventional weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

22. This session is taking place in the backdrop of several challenges – both to the disarmament and non-proliferation regime as well as to its multilateral deliberative and negotiating platforms. The failure to achieve agreement on disarmament and non-proliferation at the September Summit last year highlighted these divergences. A decade long impasse at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the deadlock for two years within this Commission
underscore the fact that there are clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among member states to deal with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

23. These differences are dangerous for peace and stability, particularly in regions riven by conflicts and tensions. It is therefore essential to promote, through consultations and agreement among all UN member states, a new security consensus to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation. It must be premised on one of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter that "security" is the right of every State.

24. The following elements could constitute the basis for such a consensus:

   a) Affirmation of the centrality of UN Charter for peaceful resolution of underlying disputes and acceptance of the principle of "equal security" for all States;
   b) Adherence to principles and purposes of UN Charter to advance disarmament and non-proliferation and to promote and preserve international and regional peace and security;
   c) Initial steps towards disarmament including those agreed at the international level; De-alert nuclear weapons;
   d) Compliance by all States Parties to their respective obligations towards WMD disarmament and non-proliferation;
   e) Normalization of the relationship of the three non-NPT States with the NPT regime (as suggested by Dr. al-Baradei and others);
   f) Commitment by all States to implement agreed measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMDs and their means of delivery;
   g) Reaffirmation that preventing the proliferation of WMDs shall not hamper international cooperation for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful uses should not be used as a cover for proliferation;
   h) Progress towards conventional weapons control and non-proliferation, specially in regions of conflict with a view to promoting the maintenance of security at the lowest possible level of armaments;
   i) Full implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALW;
   j) Revitalization of the UN disarmament machinery, specially the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the First Committee to address the international security, disarmament and proliferation challenges;

25. A new consensus would help address such threats as WMD proliferation to terrorists, the reported new war fighting nuclear doctrines and the accompanying design and development of the useable nuclear weapons, the development and accumulation of advanced conventional weapons, development and deployment of ABM system globally and regionally, the absence of an international agreement on missiles and the militarization of the outer space.

Mr. Chairman,

26. With regard to consideration of the issue of improving the Commission’s working methods, we share the NAM view that this issue has to be seen and discussed within the overarching process of the revitalization of the General Assembly. A balanced and comprehensive approach is essential. At the same time, it should be noted that the deadlock in the CD or for that matter in the overall multilateral disarmament machinery, is political, not procedural. Therefore, it
cannot be broken by semantics or clever proposals for a programme of work. What is required is the political will to engage in substantive negotiations on all issues; not a “quick fix” to address only some of them.

27. Pending disagreements on the CD’s programme of work and agenda, the Commission could consider, within its three year cycle of work programme, the possibility of convening a special session to evolve and develop a new consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.