Mr. Chairman,

I congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee at this important 60th session of the General Assembly.

I also take this opportunity to commend Ambassador Alfonso de Alba for his effective leadership of this Committee in the last session.

We associate ourselves with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

In my statement, I will touch on three cross-cutting themes: (a) the global security environment; (b) regional security; and (c) institutional challenges.

Global Security Environment

Mr. Chairman,

The global security architecture is in a state of flux. There are clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among member states to deal with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

We cannot gloss over the fact that negotiations on these issues broke down for the 2005 Summit Outcome, leaving “empty spaces” in the outcome document. The consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has eroded and the multilateral disarmament machinery has been severely weakened. This opens the way for unilateral or discriminatory and coercive approaches.

The failure to achieve agreement at the Summit on disarmament and non-proliferation reflects the deep differences among Member States and is dangerous for peace and stability, especially in regions of tension. It was against this backdrop that President General Pervez Musharraf in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 14 said: “We must evolve a new consensus to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation”. This must be promoted through consultations and agreement among all UN member states, not just some self selected, even if well-meaning group of countries.

In building such a consensus, we cannot but start from the basic premise in the UN Charter that “security” is the right of every State. The Declaration of SSOD-I adopted the principle of “equal security” for all States. In our interdependent world, such security can be best promoted collectively, i.e. multilaterally, not through national means, or within restricted groups, no matter how powerful.

To promote genuine disarmament and non-proliferation, we must address the motives which drive States to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These motives include perceived threats from superior conventional or non-conventional forces; the existence of disputes and conflicts with more powerful States; and from discrimination in the application of international norms and laws.
10. Of course, WMD proliferation is dangerous. It can multiply the threat of the possible use of such Weapons of Mass Destruction. But the proliferation can be contained only if it is accompanied by a parallel effort to realize WMD disarmament. Discrimination and asymmetric possession of WMD is not a recipe for non-proliferation or regional or global stability. Nor are technology constraints a durable answer unless the motives for proliferation are addressed.

11. We must, of course, address the new threat of terrorists acquiring WMD. Again, this can succeed only through collective and cooperative measures, not through coercion and discrimination.

12. And, new threats cannot blind us to the danger posed by the existence and continuous improvement i.e. vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be promoted and pursued simultaneously; they are two sides of the same coin.

13. A new security consensus should take into account the need to address existing and emerging global challenges to regional and international security. This goal can be achieved through the Conference on Disarmament or a special session of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC).

14. Such a new consensus would help address such threats as WMD proliferation to terrorists, vertical nuclear proliferation, the development and accumulation of advanced conventional weapons, development and deployment of ABM system, the absence of an international agreement on missiles and the militarization of the outer space.

15. In the area of nuclear disarmament, credible steps by nuclear weapon states within a reasonable time frame are essential to revalidate the “bargain” on disarmament and non-proliferation and restore a genuine balance between them. Secondly, cooperation in the peaceful use of energy must continue to enjoy international support under globally agreed conditions. Thirdly, there is need to reconcile nuclear reality within the global non-proliferation regime i.e. the existence of 8, not 5, nuclear weapons States.

16. Although Pakistan subscribes to the objectives of the NPT it is a nuclear weapon state. We are already fulfilling the NPT’s non-proliferation norms. Pakistan is prepared to continue to act in consonance with the obligations, undertaken by nuclear weapon states, under Article I, II and III of the NPT. But, we cannot be expected to adhere to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. We are observing a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests. IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei has called for the inclusion of the three non-NPT nuclear states in future talks on disarmament and non-proliferation. Such calls should be heeded. Universality is a noble objective but it must respect existing realities.

17. Pakistan supports negotiations on a fissile material treaty (FMT) in accordance with the Shannon Mandate and the A-5 proposal for a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty. The report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) clearly identifies the key issues which include a) scope of the treaty, b) past and future production of fissile material and c) management of such material. The agreed basis for negotiating the Treaty cannot be described as “pre conditions”.

18. Nor are prospects for a moratorium on fissile material production realistic. In any event, a non-verifiable moratorium will neither enhance confidence nor advance the objective of a comprehensive verifiable fissile material treaty. Pakistan will halt fissile material production consistent with the requirements of its nuclear deterrence posture.

19. Unless nuclear disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear weapon states will continue to be entitled to assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. The security
assurances offered by most nuclear weapons states are restrictive, partial and qualified. Threats to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in certain circumstances must be disavowed. What will enhance the security of the non-nuclear weapon state are universal, unconditional and legally binding assurances.

20. We share the view that the existing international legal instruments are inadequate to prevent weaponization of outer space. There is a need to consolidate and reinforce the regime and enhance its effectiveness even as we comply strictly with existing agreements. China and Russia, in this regard, have done important work. We, therefore, support the A-5 proposal to commence work on PAROS in a CD Ad Hoc Committee.

21. We share the global concern regarding unbridled ballistic missile proliferation. To avert it, we call for enhanced efforts to conclude a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and universally negotiated treaty within the United Nations system on missiles covering all aspects.

22. The chemical weapons prohibition regime, overseen by OPCW, is a manifestation of the success of multilateralism. However, we must speed up the destruction of declared chemical weapons and address related environmental and safety concerns.

23. On the BTWC, we should look forward to 2006 Review Conference and beyond to make renewed efforts to build a regime that can ensure compliance and verification by all Member States.

Pakistan's security policy

24. Pakistan's strategic programme is security driven, not status driven. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons only after nuclear proliferation had happened in South Asia. The sole purpose of our capability is to deter all forms of external aggression that can endanger our national security. Our strategic posture reflects restraint and responsibility. We maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrence. Pakistan will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. We are against an open-ended nuclear or conventional arms race in South Asia.

25. Pakistan has taken a series of measures to ensure responsible stewardship of our nuclear programme:

(a) In 2000, we created a National Command Authority with a strong military-civilian interface, which oversees and manages our strategic assets and nuclear programme.

(b) A reliable control and command system has been established;

(c) Custodial controls have been streamlined and strengthened to guard against risks of leakage of technology, accidental launch or unauthorized deployment. Oversight is stringent.

(d) We have passed and enforced laws to strengthen export controls on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Last year, we enacted a comprehensive Export Control Act to deal with nuclear and biological weapons which tightens controls over export, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of sensitive goods, technologies and equipments. We are working on a separate new law on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) ensures safe operation of civilian nuclear plants.

**Regional Security**

26. Resolute efforts should be made to defuse regional tensions and resolve conflicts in the Middle East. Pakistan supports the fulfillment of international obligations by all states and the objective of creating a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East.

27. All states must observe their treaty obligations. Pakistan is opposed to nuclear proliferation. However, every country has the right to develop technology for peaceful purposes. Pakistan is opposed to the use of force which would further destabilize an already volatile region.

28. We welcome the progress achieved at the Six-Party Talks aimed at ensuring a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons as well as addressing the security concerns of all concerned states in North East Asia.

29. In South Asia, Pakistan seeks to promote a Strategic Restraint Regime with India which has three constituents: (a) conflict resolution; (b) nuclear and missile restraint; and (c) conventional balance.

30. Since early 2003, we have sustained a multi-track engagement with India encompassing confidence building measures and a composite dialogue. President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in their meeting here in New York on 14 September, reiterated their commitment to ensure a peaceful settlement of all pending issues including Jammu and Kashmir; and agreed that possible options for a peacefully negotiated settlement should continue to be pursued in a sincere spirit and a purposeful manner.

31. Since June 2004, Pakistan and India have held three rounds of consultations to elaborate nuclear and conventional CBMs. Both countries have affirmed that their respective nuclear capabilities, based on national security imperatives, constituted a factor of stability. We are working on strategic stability, confidence building, and risk reduction. Two days ago, on October 3, Pakistan and India signed an agreement on advance notification of ballistic missile tests, during the Indian External Affairs Minister’s visit to Islamabad.

32. As part of the Strategic Restraint Regime we have also made the following proposals:

- Continuation of the moratorium on further nuclear tests.
- Maintenance of nuclear weapons on de-alert status.
- No operational deployment of anti-ballistic missiles.
- No acquisition or deployment of anti-ballistic system.

33. In South Asia we need a stable balance of conventional forces to ensure strategic stability between Pakistan and India. Massive induction of sophisticated weaponry including combat aircraft, aircraft carriers, airborne early warning and control system, missile defense, nuclear submarines and war ships will accentuate conventional asymmetries and compel greater reliance on nuclear and missile deterrence. There must be restraint both in the demand and the supply on conventional weapons in South Asia. We agree with Undersecretary Nabouyasu Abe that the
preponderant focus on the WMD threat should not lessen our attention to the matters relating to regulation and reduction of conventional arms and armed forces.

34. The entire international community has an interest in ensuring strategic stability in South Asia at the lowest possible level and not to accelerate an arms race in the region. Discriminatory approaches in the nuclear or conventional fields will not advance stability in South Asia. In the strategic and defence areas, Pakistan always demands and deserves parity of treatment with our neighbour.

Institutional deficit

35. The international community must seek to repair the erosion in the ability of its disarmament machinery to promote disarmament and non-proliferation. The First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament as well as the UN Disarmament Commission, among others, provide the internationally agreed multilateral forums to address issues of non-proliferation and disarmament. New initiatives that bypass the existing multilateral framework offer only temporary solutions for counter-proliferation, non-proliferation and non-compliance. An unequal and restricted Security Council cannot supplant or circumvent multilateral negotiating processes. Unilateral restrictions and selective regimes will not promote security; they will exacerbate insecurity. Elaboration of treaty regimes is no doubt an arduous exercise, but once treaties have been agreed freely they have a better chance of commanding adherence and compliance.

36. We agree with Secretary General Kofi Annan that “we must revitalize our multilateral frameworks … to address the growing risks of a cascade of proliferation…..” Multilateral norms and instruments enjoy universal legality and acceptance. Decisions taken in exclusive or “non-institutionalized multilateral forums” will not have legitimacy in the long run. We must, therefore, reaffirm our strong commitment to multilateralism and multilateral approaches.”

37. One definite way to move forward is to activate the CD by breaking its chronic and by now unsustainable impasse. The deadlock in the CD is political, not procedural. Therefore, it cannot be broken by semantic or clever proposals for a programme of work. What we need is the political will to engage in substantive negotiations on all issues; not a “quick fix” to address only some of them.

Mr. Chairman,

38. This is a moment for reflection. We must not just lament on our past and recent failures, but look to the future with the vision required to realize the goals of disarmament, non-proliferation in ways that enhance the security of all States and thus promote global peace and security.

39. As the steward of this important Committee, you have a unique opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to evolve a new synthesis, a new consensus. During this very session, you could hold informal consultations to map out a collective future strategy. We assure you of our full support in such an endeavor.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.