Mr. Chairman,

Our warm felicitations to you and other members of the Bureau accompany the confidence that your extensive skills and experience will provide a befitting closure to our deliberations. You can count on this delegation's full support and cooperation. May I also register our deep appreciation for the contribution of your distinguished predecessor to our work last year.

Mr. Chairman,

2. The decade succeeding the Cold War witnessed a remarkable surge in the globalization of the world economy. It also, distressfully, saw a significant retreat from the principle of equal and collective security as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly, two contrasting trends define our endeavours today. Economic integration on the one hand, and fragmentation of security on the other. While the impact of the former on human well-being so far remains mixed, the verdict on the latter is out and is unequivocal. International security must be truly that: security for all underpinned by a global architecture founded on cooperation and concord. The impulse for the accumulation and brandishing of power to create asymmetrical security equations, regionally or globally, is intrinsically subversive of peace and has been rejected, time and again, in the ebb and flow of history. Only that security structure will endure and engender peace which flows from the UN Charter, adheres to its principles, is consistent with its objectives and respectful of its decisions.

3. The horrors of war had triggered the vision of a world body acting as the custodian of international peace and security. Retrenchment of this role would be fraught with irreversible and incalculable consequences. Interstate relations must, therefore, return to the fold of the Charter. Disputes and differences should be resolved peacefully and within the framework of the United Nations. Use of force, except strictly in self-defence, is fundamentally repugnant to the Charter.

4. The threat of force looms larger than ever in South Asia, which has been described as the most dangerous place on earth. The situation in this volatile region emphatically illustrates the inadmissible preference for war over diplomacy. Nearly a million troops have been deployed along our borders and the Line of Control in Kashmir with just one objective: to force Pakistan to back away from the principled position that disputes between India and Pakistan should be resolved through the application of the UN Charter and not the use of force. The rejection of this legitimate demand has been accompanied by naked threats of military action and pre-emptive strikes. Is it not a monumental irony that aggression is being threatened against a country for urging the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kashmir.

5. Irresponsible sabre rattling and threats of aggression should now stop and make way for dialogue for the settlement of the core dispute of Jammu and Kashmir and other outstanding issues. Continued repression of the Kashmiri people and the organization of electoral charades do not provide the basis for durable peace in South Asia. Reckless build-up of conventional and strategic weapons to underpin the provenly flawed policy of aggrandizement, negates the aspirations of the people of South Asia including the billion citizens of India itself. Military adventurism fueled by the misplaced and unachievable illusion of supremacy has already brought our region to the edge of catastrophe. In his latest report on the Work of the Organization, the Secretary General of the United Nations has stated:

"I have consistently appealed to the parties to resume their bilateral dialogue and to resolve their differences, over Kashmir in particular, by peaceful means. I encourage both sides to reduce
their military contingents stationed in Kashmir, and to consider other measures and initiatives aimed at further reducing tensions. My own good offices remain available to both sides to promote a peaceful solution."

Mr. Chairman,

6. India’s response to these thoughtful words would determine the fate of South Asia. Would it become a land of peace and progress or continue in its lamentable course of confrontation, backwardness and misery?

7. The nuclearization of the region also warrants the creation of a new security structure founded on dialogue, peace, arms control and cooperation. Accordingly, Pakistan has proposed the establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia, encompassing the following principles:

One: India and Pakistan should formalize their respective unilateral nuclear test moratoriums, perhaps through a bilateral treaty;

Two: Not operationally weaponize nuclear capable missile systems;

Three: Not operationally deploy nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and to keep them on de-alert;

Four: Formalize the previous understanding to provide prior and adequate notification of flight tests of missiles;

Five: Observe a moratorium on the acquisition, deployment or development of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems;

Six: Implement further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons by miscalculation or accident;

Seven: Open discussions on the nuclear security doctrines of the two countries with a view to forestalling an all out nuclear arms race;

Eight: An agreement on non-use of force, including the non-use of nuclear weapons.

Nine: Conventional arms balance and a political mechanism for the resolution of disputes, particularly Kashmir.

8. We are ready to pursue these proposals in a bilateral dialogue, under UN auspices or through third party mediation.

Mr. Chairman,

9. At the global level, the arms control and disarmament agenda has, regrettably, achieved neither its potential nor its promise. In our view, the long-standing objective of general and complete disarmament under strong and effective international control, as stipulated in the Final Document of SSOD-I, remains relevant as ever, and should be pursued with the greatest vigour. The following steps are of fundamental importance:

One: The existing huge nuclear inventories be attenuated substantially. The Moscow Treaty constitutes a salutary first step in this direction in that it reduces the imminent threat posed by deployed nuclear weapons. However, the long term threat remains undiminished. Real threat reduction requires destruction of nuclear weapons, which we hope would eventually happen to be followed by general and complete disarmament.
Two: The NPT nuclear-weapon States are “unequivocally” committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This commitment needs to be operationalized. Negotiations should commence on Nuclear Disarmament at the earliest in the Conference on Disarmament.

Three: Adequate measures in the form of a multilaterally negotiated legal instrument will be necessary to prevent an arms race in outer space. Missile Defences create the Sisyphean dilemma of plunging the world into another costly and destabilizing arms race. Sustainable security cannot be achieved in the midst of an interminable arms race.

Four: Multilateral negotiations must convene to conclude a legally-binding international instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states in accordance with the UN resolutions. Such an instrument would provide credible guarantees against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Five: Regional approaches to international security and disarmament must be strengthened, especially in tension-ridden regions such as the Middle East and South Asia. Every region has its sui generis dynamics. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation require effective redressal of security imbalances at the regional level. In accordance with its traditional resolution on Regional Disarmament, Pakistan has proposed this item for inclusion in the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Only one delegation demurred.

10. Other steps should include: a) commitment to the CTBT and, pending its entry into force, continued observance of unilateral moratoriums by the nuclear-weapon states; b) conclusion of a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable Fissile Materials Treaty; c) full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; d) removal of artificial hindrances to the promotion of peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

11. At the same time, Member States should strengthen their domestic and export controls on sensitive materials, equipment and technologies in accordance with their obligations under relevant international legal instruments. Pakistan, being a party to both the BWC and the CWC, and a State with nuclear capability, is fully conscious of its responsibilities. A National Command Authority, under the Chairmanship of the Head of Government and including three Federal Ministers and Chiefs of Armed Services, has been set up to provide policy direction, supervise the deployment and employment of assets and approve measures to ensure custodial safety and complete institutional control. We will continue to strengthen our controls as required.

12. Axiomatically, cooperative security at the global, regional and sub-regional levels cannot be achieved unilaterally. Indeed, the multilateral approach offers the best hope. It is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament remains mired in an impasse. It must develop a balanced programme of work which answers to the concerns of all parties.

Mr. Chairman,

13. The international community also needs to address the issue of missiles in a cooperative spirit. We appreciate the work done by the Panel of Governmental Experts on Missiles, set up by the Secretary General last year. For understandable reasons, their Report remained inconclusive.

14. We favour the elaboration of a global treaty on missiles as part of a comprehensive disarmament programme. Accordingly, we have proposed the item of “Missiles in all aspects” for inclusion in the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. A global treaty will take time. We are ready to consider global interim measures aimed at reducing missile related threats at all levels. These could range from de-alerting nuclear weapons and missile systems to evolving multilaterally negotiated controls over the transfer of sensitive technologies and supplemented by
alternative measures for maintaining military balance, especially in volatile regions, and enhancing cooperation in technologies for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Chairman,

15. We regret the fact that the Fifth BWC Review Conference last year had to be suspended. In view of the evolving threats, particularly in the context of bio-terrorism, this instrument should be further strengthened. To this end, Pakistan would continue to remain engaged. The reconvened Fifth Review Conference in November would need to agree on a balanced and meaningful follow-up programme, encompassing both regulatory and promotional activities.

16. On the other hand, the work within the framework of the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW) is proceeding satisfactorily. The CCW is a unique treaty in that it strikes a balance between legitimate security requirements and humanitarian concerns. Preservation of this balance is a pre-requisite for the continuing success of the CCW process.

17. We also draw satisfaction from the adoption of the Programme of Action by the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Notwithstanding its imperfections, it provides a good basis to address the issue in an incremental manner. Pakistan has already adopted a national policy in this regard which is being effectively implemented.

18. At the deliberations of the First Committee last year, Pakistan had underscored the necessity of addressing the threats to global and regional peace and stability from increasing sophistication of conventional weapons i.e. the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. As a first step, it was suggested that the United Nations or UNIDIR be tasked with preparing a study with the participation of governmental experts on the subject.

19. We reiterate our proposal. Dealing with this issue is necessary. Otherwise, the escalating asymmetry in conventional force capabilities between states, especially at the regional and sub-regional levels, will continue to abet military adventurism. We must deal with this question on an urgent basis.

Mr. Chairman,

20. Military expenditures consumed 850 billion dollars of this Planet’s wealth last year dwarfing, by a wide margin, the GDP of almost half the human race. New and unique weapon systems are being developed or procured. The multilateral disarmament machinery is virtually out of business. Has global security been enhanced by these trends? The answer clearly is in the negative. Unequal and fragmented security breeds more insecurity, spawns fear and military expense while causing deprivation to the very people who are sought to be protected. Serious and earnest collective efforts need to be initiated to retrieve the enfeebling commitment to multilateralism and the principle of universal and equal security lest, in the course of time, we find ourselves on the wrong side of history.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

New York
10 October 2002