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Mr. President,
Thank you for convening today’s Open Debate on this important subject. The debate is timely as it coincides with the ongoing process of a Comprehensive Review of the 1540 mechanism.
This process should benefit from the views of the larger membership. We hope the diverse views expressed by Member States during the 1540 open consultations will be taken onboard.
Mr. President,
The global disarmament landscape presents a gloomy picture. The principal reason for this is the lack of progress made by Nuclear Weapons States in fulfilling their legal nuclear disarmament obligations. That has negatively impacted on the efficacy of the non-proliferation regime. Disarmament and non-proliferation are inextricably linked. It is unrealistic to expect progress on one without movement on the other.
A key challenge to long-held non-proliferation norms and rules is the grant of discriminatory waivers to some and making exceptions out of power or profit considerations.
The grant of such waivers carries obvious proliferation risks. These ‘special arrangements’ are not only discriminatory and denote nuclear double standards but also open up the possibility of diversion of material intended for peaceful uses to military purposes. They contravene non-proliferation rules and also undermine regional strategic stability.
Mr. President,
We should not forget that fulfillment of non-proliferation objectives is a shared responsibility and we are only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. Improved matchmaking by the Committee, making it more responsive to the requests by States for assistance is imperative.
Resolution 1540 has made useful contributions to the advancement of non-proliferation goals. The success of this resolution owes less to its Chapter-VII provisions than to the cooperative approach it has engendered to promote its implementation.
Mr. President,
We are cognizant of the fact that challenges in addressing proliferation of WMDs, their means of delivery, and related materials are imposing. Differences in State capacities such as gaps in legal and regulatory frameworks; lack of effective export control mechanisms; border management capacities; lack of human and technological resources for effective implementation, all compound these difficulties.
We also recognize the importance of staying one step ahead of non-State actors that seek to kill and maim innocent people by using WMDs. Some of the suggested solutions such as making “radical changes” in the 1540 regime, however, could take us farther rather than closer to our shared objective of addressing proliferation challenges.
Lets take the example of submission of national reports: As of April 2016, seventeen states have not submitted even one report. Then there are others, including my own country, which have submitted several.
Rather than casting aspersions on the intentions of States that could not report, we need to understand their shortcomings and assist them. Challenges faced by States can largely be off-set by the provision of non-discriminatory technical and financial assistance, upon the request of the States, without any pre-conditions.
Creating additional reporting obligations would only add to reporting fatigue, without any real impact on achieving universal reporting.
It is of paramount importance that the voluntary nature of visits to states and national action plans, as envisaged in resolution 1977, be preserved. Micro-managing tasks that Member States need to undertake in implementing the provisions of resolution 1540 may be counter-productive.
Naming and shaming of States that fall short of implementation standards due to limited capacities could jeopardize the cooperative spirit that this mechanism has benefitted from.
Mr. President,
In order to ensure that the Comprehensive Review helps Members States better manage challenges with regard to implementation of 1540, its final product needs to be realistic, generally acceptable and practical. It should take into account the existing provisions of Resolution 1540.
To change the focus of 1540 from a preventive mechanism, aimed at thwarting access of non-state actors to WMDs, and assign it mandates it is ill equipped to deal with, would be an error. Also, obligations under 1540 should not be interpreted in a manner, which impinge upon the responsibilities of IAEA and OPCW.
Mr. President,
Let me turn to what my country has done to implement Resolution 1540 and fulfill its non-proliferation obligations in general:
Mr. President,
These credentials, among others, clearly establish Pakistan’s eligibility to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We expect that a non-discriminatory, criteria-based approach is followed for extending NSG membership which strengthens the non-proliferation regime.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.