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Mr. Chairman,
The second cluster of your draft text titled, “the question of the veto” lists 18 paragraphs representing respective positions on this important issue. A careful reading of the text reveals four obvious patterns of positions.
Firstly, there are Member States and groups of States that demand complete elimination of veto.
Then there are Member States that want the veto power to be extended beyond the current P-5.
Similarly, there are States that do not accept any change in the current veto structure.
Finally, a number of Member States want some sort of curtailment in exercise of veto power or have proposed its use to be regulated through a certain mechanism.
Diversity in respective positions is not the only road-block on the path of reform of veto. The issue is inextricably inter-linked with other four key issues of the Security Council reform. Most importantly, veto is linked to the question of membership and categories, being an exclusive privilege of the five permanent members. It is also intrinsically linked to the Council’s working methods and the decision making process. Many of the issues of the Security Council that we intend to address through its reform are attributed directly or indirectly to the veto power.
The above diversities and complexities pose a challenge that we need to address with an open mind, showing both innovation and flexibility. It will be disingenuous to try to overcome this challenge by any simplistic merging of positions or language.
Mr. Chairman,
Our delegation notes with satisfaction that we, in the Uniting for Consensus Group, have contributed positively to the deliberations on the question of veto. In paragraphs 2.3 and 2.10, the Italy-Colombia paper together with our L-68 draft resolution of 2005, list options that would limit the scope and arbitrary use of veto. These are practical proposals that steer through the emotional idealism of many Member States, who are rightfully opposed to the concept and practice of veto. Similarly, these proposals also soften the blow of the blunt realism of a select few Member States, who view veto as an indispensible tool for working of the United Nations System. Our proposals have been made in full knowledge of an unfortunate reality that any proposal to abolish or severely restrict veto is itself likely to be vetoed.
We must also closely examine the nature of comprehensive reform and endorse a model that has an in-built ability to check the veto power. In our view, the most effective and feasible way of balancing the power of veto is to increase the number of elected members of the Security Council. Increased number of the elected non-permanent members will tilt the balance away from the permanent members. Accordingly, the burden of vetoing a resolution will increase markedly for a permanent member. Similarly, in an enlarged Council, a higher number of affirmative votes would be required to pass a resolution. Keeping the current ratio (of 3 to 5), 16 affirmative votes would be required in a Council of say 26. With a higher ratio, the affirmative votes required could be 17 or 18. This is where the blocking power of veto can be balanced, not by another undemocratic veto, but by the combined weight of 8 or 9 or more non-permanent members of the Council who may decide to act together in collective interest.
In terms of empowering the developing world, this will be a situation where for example Africa with its 6 or 7 seats, Asia with an equal number and GRULAC with its own can have a real say in decision making in the Council. Going further, a concrete way of preserving collective interests is to reach an understanding, and preferably a Charter amendment, which would require concurrence of all members of a region for adoption of any resolution relating to that region. This may be of particular interest to Africa. We believe that such an arrangement will also be in step with the increasing emphasis being laid in recent years in the Council for adopting unified and consensus decisions for greater legitimacy and effectiveness.
A number of Member States, in particular the S-5, have also put forth interesting concepts on limiting the use of veto. The proposals should be considered within the broader perspective of the Security Council reform as I have just outlined. We are not in favour of pending the entire veto question to a future review or taking it up before or after agreeing on certain other issues. The reform of the Security Council must be comprehensive --- based on single undertaking in which, the question of veto should be addressed appropriately.
Thank you.