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Mr. Chairman,
Today, global efforts to regulate, reduce and prevent the spread of armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, are facing serious challenges. Thirty six years ago, in the first Special Session on Disarmament SSOD-I, the General Assembly reached consensus on the mandate and machinery to pursue the disarmament agenda. Over time, this consensus has broken down and the shared goal of nuclear disarmament has become more elusive.
Despite reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, nuclear disarmament remains an outstanding objective on the international security agenda.
A progressive erosion of the international consensus on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament norms, rules and mechanisms is evident from the following developments:
One, opposition by most of the NPT Nuclear Weapon States to negotiations on a Nuclear Disarmament Convention;
Two, the prolonged non-entry into force of the CTBT, and prospects of new tests by some States;
Three, the continuing reliance of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines of some states and the threats to use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapon States;
Four, pursuit of selective non-proliferation measures, nuclear exceptionalism and discriminatory conditions for peaceful nuclear cooperation;
Five, pursuit of doctrines for use of conventional weapons even where nuclear deterrence exists.
Six, growing asymmetry in military power among States;
Seven, the danger of acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction by terrorists and other non-state actors;
Eight, the inability of the disarmament machinery to evolve consensus on any of the issues that are on its agenda;
Both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are important for international peace and security. Their simultaneous pursuit alone can erect effective barriers against risks of proliferation and promote disarmament. The so-called step-by-step approach alone is subterfuge to circumvent nuclear disarmament. The determination of few powerful states to retain nuclear weapons while prescribing strict non-proliferation regimes for others only aggravates the sense of insecurity among states.
Mr. Chairman,
Despite high rhetoric and moralistic assertions, the fact is that nuclear weapons remain integral to strategic doctrines of military alliances. Nuclear weapons also provide extended deterrence to non-nuclear weapon states who are members of military alliances. As such these states indirectly and implicitly encourage the possession or even use of nuclear weapons as part of the strategic doctrines of their alliances.
Pakistan recognizes that nuclear disarmament will not happen overnight or even in a life time. But the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons must start now – it has been too long since SSOD-I for us to give practical shape to obligations adopted by consensus.
Mr. Chairman,
Pakistan believes that a rules-based, equitable and non-discriminatory international order needs to be evolved that must pursue a comprehensive disarmament agenda. This agenda should build upon existing achievements and should include measures to:
One, Address security concerns of all states.
Two, Carry forward strategic and conventional weapons limitation and reductions. Unilateral and bilateral measures undertaken by some are partial, insufficient and cannot substitute implementation of multilateral disarmament obligations.
Three, Strengthen the international non-proliferation regime through policies that are equitable, criteria-based and non-discriminatory. There should be no exceptionalism or preferential treatment driven by motivations of power and profit.
Four, There should be an end to horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Extending nuclear deterrence to alliance partners amounts itself to horizontal proliferation.
Five, Negative security assurances should be extended to non-nuclear weapons states. These assurances are cost free and do not undermine the security of Nuclear Weapons States.
Six, Instead of partial measures, disowning obligations to disarm and by advocating a treaty banning only the future production of fissile material – which is not even a non-proliferation measure – there should be a reduction of existing fissile material stocks as well, which will be a genuine step towards elimination of nuclear weapons.
Seven, Along with these steps the international community should immediately start negotiations on a Convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.
Mr. Chairman,
For a vast majority of States, nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority on the international security agenda. The High Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament by the General Assembly during its 68th session, on 26 September 2013, was the first ever summit at the UN General Assembly on nuclear disarmament. We support UNGA resolution 68/32, adopted on 5 December 2013 titled “Follow-up to the 2013 High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament”, which calls for the urgent commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons.
Unfortunately, however, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to start negotiations on such a Disarmament Convention over the last 30 years.
Efforts are long over-due to craft a renewed consensus on nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. Without underestimating the potential challenges in evolving a reenergized global consensus, efforts need to be redoubled for a world genuinely without nuclear weapons. Pakistan reiterates the longstanding call by the 120 members of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) to convene a Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly (SSOD-IV) to revive a global consensus that ensures elimination of nuclear weapons, while meeting the security concerns of all states.
Mr. Chairman,
The UN Charter obligates all States not to use or threaten to use force. This obligation extends to nuclear weapons states as well. The demand for negative security assurances was raised by the non-nuclear-weapons States in the 1960s in pursuit of their security to which they have a right under the UN Charter.
Pakistan, along with a vast majority of UN Member-States believes that this issue is ripe for negotiations at the CD. It would also contribute to building a climate of trust and understanding and could contribute to easing of current strains on the wider disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.
Mr. Chairman,
In pursuance of negative security assurances, Pakistan will be presenting the traditional draft resolution entitled: “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, on behalf of 19 delegations co-sponsoring it as of today.
Similar to the drafts adopted at previous First Committee sessions, this draft resolution has been technically updated. Reaffirming the urgent need to reach an early agreement of effective international arrangements on negative security assurances, the draft notes with satisfaction that there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention on this subject. It appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work towards an early agreement and recommends further intensification of efforts to evolve a common approach and a common formula on this issue. Finally, it recommends to the Conference on Disarmament to actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on negative security assurances.
My delegation and the co-sponsors look forward to the adoption of this draft resolution with the widest possible support.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman